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abstract
Empirical evidence shows that secrecy in science has increased over the past dec-
ades, partly as a result of the commercialization of science. There is a good
prima facie case against secrecy in science. It is part of the traditional ethos of
science that it is a collective and open truth-seeking endeavor. In this paper, I
will investigate whether secrecy in science can ever be epistemically justied. To
answer this question, I rst distinguish between different sorts of secrecy. Next, I
propose an account of what it is for a practice to be epistemically justied, with
the help of work by Alvin Goldman and Philip Kitcher. I then discuss motivations
for secrecy in science that are found in the literature to see whether they amount to,
or can be turned into, epistemic justications for secrecy. The conclusion is that,
although some forms of secrecy – particularly those motivated by universal
moral concerns – are epistemically justied, secrecy that arises from special,
often commercial, interests is not.
1. introduction
Contemporary science is big business. A lot of research is carried out in private R&D
departments. Companies have all sorts of nancial ties with research undertaken at aca-
demic institutions, ranging from occasional sponsoring of individual research projects,
to long-term public–private partnerships involving multiple projects, research institutes
or research facilities. Universities themselves, too, promote an entrepreneurial spirit, by
encouraging scientists to obtain intellectual property rights or start up their own compa-
nies, or by securing nancial support from private investors in return for privileged access
to research results (Etzkowitz 2008; Geiger 2004; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter
and Rhoades 2004).
Various concerns have been raised about these increasingly intimate connections
between private money and scientic research (Krimsky 2003; Resnik 2007; Washburn
2005). Private money has been shown to skew the research agenda, it tends to have nega-
tive effects on the scientic quality of research and it can corrupt academic culture. I will
be concerned with one effect of the commercialization of science in particular: secrecy. I
want to investigate whether secrecy in science can be epistemically justied, i.e. (roughly)
conducive to the growth of knowledge. The traditional normative ideal of science supports
a strong prima facie case against an afrmative answer to this question. It is part of this
ideal that scientic knowledge is public knowledge and that the ‘republic of science’ – to
use Michael Polanyi’s term – is characterized by openness, unimpeded access to
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knowledge and free ow of information. Robert Merton famously argued that commun-
ism, i.e. the shared ownership of scientic knowledge, is one of the norms that make up
the ethos of science: ‘The substantive ndings of science are a product of social collabor-
ation and are assigned to the community’ (1973a: 273). Many contemporary ethical codes
for proper scientic conduct are heavily inuenced by Merton’s ethos and thus include
norms promoting openness, disclosure of information and shared ownership of ndings
(Kourany 2008; Radder 2010a). Although I agree that this normative ideal contains
much that merits defense, I will nonetheless argue that, under the conditions in which
science must operate in our world, some forms of secrecy are epistemically justied.
In the next section, I review some of the evidence showing that secrecy is increasing as a
result of commercialization and chart different kinds of secrecy. In sections 3 and 4 I
develop an account of what it is for a certain practice or course of action to be epistemi-
cally justied, by drawing on Alvin Goldman’s veritistic epistemology and Philip Kitcher’s
work on the role of science in liberal democracies. In sections 5 through 9, I discuss several
rationales that are offered to justify secrecy and investigate whether they amount to epis-
temic justications for secrecy. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. secrecy in science: an overview and some distinctions
Over the past decade or two, there have been a number of highly publicized cases invol-
ving egregious attempts by private sponsors to keep the results of scientic inquiries secret
to protect commercial interests. Since these cases are well-known and information about
them is easily available, I will not rehearse them here.1 Such cases offer instructive
examples of how things can go badly wrong under the inuence of commercial interests,
but we should not rely on anecdotal evidence for the claim that secrecy in science is
increasing under the inuence of commercialization. This general claim needs more
empirical support.
Various recent studies suggest that secrecy is indeed increasing and implicate commer-
cialization as an important contributing factor (Resnik 2007: 95ff.). One study (Hong and
Walsh 2009) compares the elds of mathematics, physics and experimental biology over a
period of 30 years, investigating whether secrecy (understood as unwillingness to share
and discuss results with colleagues) has increased as a result of commercialization and
increased competition. Analyzing survey results from 1966 and 1998, the authors nd
that secrecy has indeed increased considerably, mostly so in biology. Both commercial
pressures and increasing competition contributed to this development.2
Another study, focusing on the biological research community working with the model
plant Arabidopsis thaliana, also conrms that commercial pressures lead to increased
1 Interested readers can consult Angell 2004; Krimsky 2003; or Washburn 2005.
2 The authors found that industry funding is associated with more secrecy, while industry collaboration is
associated with less secrecy. They suggest that industry collaboration may be part of researchers’ strat-
egies to share their ndings with the broader scientic community. They did not investigate, however,
whether industry collaboration is associated with other types of secrecy, such as publication delays or
unwillingness to share research materials (Hong and Walsh 2009: 162). There is evidence that these
types of secrecy do increase in industry collaboration settings, at least in biomedical science (Angell
2004; Krimsky 2003; Washburn 2005).
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secrecy (Evans 2010). Using a multi-track methodology that combines quantitative analy-
sis of publication records with eldwork in the relevant research community and inter-
views with scientists, the author nds that
in academic Arabidopsis research, industry funding, and to a lesser extent collaboration, reduces
the sharing of materials and increases its substitute, the interrogation of pre-publication manu-
scripts. By contrast, government funding tends to increase the sharing of both. . . . Industry funding
reduces the distance that ideas travel from industry-sponsored labs. (Evans 2010: 779)
As the author remarks, his ndings provide a conservative estimate of the effect of com-
mercialization on secrecy, since Arabidopsis research is relatively uninteresting from a
commercial perspective. One should expect the effect to be bigger in elds that are
more relevant to commercial purposes.
Recent books document that, in biomedical research pertaining to the effectiveness of
new drugs, it continues to be common practice to withhold studies with unfavorable
results from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) when applying for ofcial approval
to market new drugs (Krimsky 2003; Angell 2004; Kirsch 2010; Whitaker 2010).
Although measures have been taken to counteract this practice – all clinical trials in
which new drugs are tested must now be ofcially registered – the FDA still does not
require drug companies to submit all the available scientic information about new
drugs in a request for approval (Kirsch 2010).3 In sum, then, there is good evidence
that secrecy in science indeed increases as a result of commercialization.
To facilitate further discussion of the question whether secrecy in science can some-
times be epistemically justied, it will be useful to distinguish different forms of secrecy.
First of all, there is the subject matter of secrecy, or what is kept secret. Here we can dis-
tinguish between secrecy about aspects of scientic inquiry that are intrinsically epistemi-
cally relevant, and about aspects that are extrinsically, or contingently, epistemically
relevant. Factors such as the evidence (data and/or research materials) on which con-
clusions are based, the conclusions themselves and the methods of inquiry and analysis
are all directly relevant to the epistemic merits of the investigation. They have to do
with how reliably the inquiry gets at the truth. To the extent that such information is
kept secret, others are prevented either from using evidence or methods, learning about
certain truths (or approximate truths), or from making their own estimates about the epis-
temic quality of the inquiry.
Other factors do not have an intrinsic connection with the epistemic quality of scientic
inquiry, but do turn out to be fairly reliably correlated with epistemic goodness or badness
in research – at least in the institutional and socio-economic contexts in which science cur-
rently operates: e.g. the sources of funding for a project, the identities of the authors of
scientic articles, conicts of interest of investigators and authors, intellectual property
rights held by investigators, sources of the data and research materials that are used.
Studies that are wholly or partly sponsored by private money and studies with authors
3 After having completed most of the current paper, I came across the excellent if disturbing book Bad
Pharma (2012) by the British physician and science writer Ben Goldacre. This book presents over-
whelming evidence that intentional, institutionally ingrained and systematic secrecy continues to plague
much of biomedical science up to this very day and issues a strong warning call about the dangers this
creates for public health.
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who have (declared or undeclared) conicts of interest or with so-called ghost authors
have repeatedly been shown to be biased towards private interests.4 Unwillingness to
reveal the sources of data can be an indicator of weak research (Wicherts et al. 2011),
scientic fraud or other misconduct. These factors, then, are extrinsically epistemically rel-
evant because they provide evidence about the epistemic quality of scientic research. Such
evidence facilitates making adequate judgments about the epistemic quality of scientic
claims, which enables researchers and the public better to identify good or bad science.
This, in turn, is important to prevent science from taking wrong turns and is thus condu-
cive to the growth of knowledge.
Another distinction is that between temporary and permanent secrecy. All else being
equal, the latter will obviously hamper the growth of knowledge more than the former.
Hence, it may be easier to justify temporary secrecy than permanent secrecy.
3. epistemic justification
My main question is whether secrecy in science can be epistemically justied. To answer
this question, we rst need a working account of what it is for a practice or a course of
action, such as secrecy in science, to be epistemically justied. Before I develop such an
account, one caveat. The epistemic justication of practices is different from the justica-
tion of beliefs, which has been the topic of much mainstream epistemology. As I will
understand the notion, the epistemic justication of practices is a practical matter in the
following sense: it is determined by how effective and efcient the practice is at producing
epistemically valuable outputs, such as knowledge. This is different from the (epistemic)
justication of beliefs, which (according to most analyses) has to do with how likely beliefs
are true. The epistemic justication of practices thus has an indirect relation with the
justication of beliefs. An epistemically justied practice is a practice that is conducive
to the production of knowledge. The two kinds of justication should therefore not
be identied and what I say about the epistemic justication of practices does not apply
straightforwardly to claims about the justication of beliefs.
To develop an account of the epistemic justication of practices, I take my starting
point in Alvin Goldman’s (1999) work on social epistemology. He advocates veritism
in epistemology in general and in social epistemology in particular. This is to say that
the overall epistemic goal is truth, or at least truth-oriented: we ought to believe truths
and avoid believing falsehoods. Both individual and social epistemic practices have this
aim. To evaluate social epistemic practices, we must therefore look at how well they realize
this goal.5 To this end, Goldman develops a measure of ‘veritistic value’, which he applies
to investigate how well various social epistemic practices do in realizing the epistemic goal.
As Goldman notes (1999: 94ff), his initial characterization of the epistemic goal is too
coarse. We don’t care about all truths, but primarily about those that we have an interest
in. Only their discovery is genuinely veritistically valuable. What’s more, not all truths
appear to be equal in this regard. Some are objectively or at least intersubjectively more
4 The latest study reconrming this connection is a vast one carried out by the independent research col-
lective the Cochrane Collaboration (http://www.cochrane.org). See Lundh et al. 2012.
5 Which is not to say that this is the only appropriate way to evaluate the practice. A practice may well be
epistemically excellent, but all-things-considered bad because it is detrimental to other important goods.
jeroen de ridder
104 episteme volume 10–2
valuable than others. A person who spends her life in pursuit of trivia might seem to
accrue lots of veritistic value by her own lights, but many would agree that she is missing
out on veritistic value. This suggests that veritistic value is not solely determined by
people’s purely subjective interests, but also by objective or intersubjective standards
which imply that certain (classes of) truths are objectively of interest to humans regardless
of anyone’s personal preferences.
In thinking about social epistemic practices, this point becomes particularly important,
because in order to evaluate how well these practices do, we must look at whether
they succeed in discovering truths that the group using the practice has an interest in.
Doing this, however, requires an account of what it is for a group, such as a community
of scientists or a society, to have interests. Only then can we evaluate how well a social
epistemic practice serves the epistemic goal of discovering truths that the group has an
interest in.
Here I want to draw on Philip Kitcher’s (2001) work on the role of science in demo-
cratic societies. Kitcher, too, emphasizes that science is concerned with the discovery
truths that people have an interest in. It aims to discover signicant truths, as he puts
it. He holds that there is no fully objective and timeless account of epistemic signicance.
Rather, signicance is a function of both our natural curiosity and the practical and social
concerns of our lives (Kitcher 2001: 63ff). It develops as we see new connections between
theoretical issues and are confronted with novel practical and social concerns. The episte-
mic and the practical together determine what is signicant.
Kitcher sketches an ideal deliberative procedure to make democratic choices about
which truths are signicant and which projects science ought to pursue (2001: 117ff.).
He imagines a group of representatives for different groups in society, who are well-
informed about possible lines of inquiry and their relevance to our natural curiosity
and practical concerns. These representatives attempt to formulate a research agenda
for science. Through deliberation they seek to achieve consensus about which projects
would be most benecial for society or the human species as a whole, given the various
interests that they represent. If consensus turns out to be impossible, a majority vote deci-
des. In setting the agenda, representatives also consider potential moral constraints on
inquiry. Projects may be signicant, but nonetheless impermissible because they affect cer-
tain (already disadvantaged) groups in society unduly. Decisions resulting from this pro-
cedure lead to what Kitcher calls well-ordered science. It is not part of his ideal that
scientists or societies actually strive to implement the imagined procedure. If the scientic
agenda conforms to what would have been decided, had such a procedure been followed,
science is well-ordered.
Whether or not we agree with its details, this is the kind of account that we were look-
ing for. Kitcher’s notion of well-ordered science provides a model for thinking about what
it is for a society (or other group) to have an interest in certain truths. And that is an
important ingredient for an account of the epistemic goal of science. This goal then is
to discover signicant truths, in Kitcher’s sense.
With this account of the epistemic goal of science, we can give an account of the epis-
temic justication of a practice. A practice in science is epistemically justied to the extent
that it contributes to realizing the epistemic goal of science. We can further think of jus-
tication as having to satisfy a minimal threshold: If a certain practice or action makes it
more likely than not that signicant truths will be discovered, it is epistemically justied.
For instance, since a ban on scientic publishing will hamper the discovery of signicant
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truths, it is not epistemically justied. In contrast, using randomized clinical trials is a
reliable method to discover truths about the effectiveness of drugs and is thus justied.
4. justifying secrecy: a preliminary clarification
The question whether secrecy in science can be epistemically justied thus amounts to the
question whether it leads scientists to discover more signicant truths, or to discover
them more quickly. Before I turn to various motivations for secrecy to investigate whether
they can provide epistemic justications of secrecy, I want to make a preliminary
clarication.
It might appear obvious to some that secrecy can never be epistemically justied. My
account of epistemic justication may well be thought to strengthen the prima facie
case against secrecy. Imagine an ideal world, where people have no interest in harming
each other in any way and care about the truth in a completely disinterested way.
Scientists have no interest in personal recognition, money or glory, but are passionate
seekers of truth for truth’s sake; companies don’t have any need for trade secrets, since
intellectual property is always respected. In this ideal world the goal of science would
never be served by keeping data, research materials, methods, ndings or information
about extrinsically epistemically relevant factors secret. After all, what could be more con-
ducive to nding out the truth than complete and unhindered access to all the relevant
information?6
This might explain why we are initially inclined to think that secrecy has no place in
science. Even though it is a familiar fact that science is often an all too human undertak-
ing, we are sometimes drawn in by a romantic image of science as an unadulterated truth-
seeking enterprise, carried out by impartial scholars, in splendid isolation of the practical
concerns of everyday life in broader societies. In this image, secrecy indeed has no place.
Our actual world, however, is unlike this ideal world. In asking whether secrecy can be
epistemically justied, we must take into account the actual circumstances under which
science has to operate in our world. Secrecy can be justied if it is a means to realizing
the goal of science (better), given the way science actually has to operate in our world.
Although this isn’t always made explicit, I think such an assumption is in fact quite com-
mon, both in mainstream epistemological thinking and in more applied areas of epistem-
ology. In thinking about perceptual knowledge, for instance, we consider whether human
beings with normal perceptual abilities would be able to perceive certain things. That ima-
ginary beings with X-ray vision might be able to see through walls is irrelevant to our the-
orizing. Similarly, when considering inferential knowledge, we take into account what
people with our reasoning abilities can infer from what they already know. It is irrelevant
that a logically omniscient being could infer much more. Furthermore, in literature in
which epistemological theorizing is applied to real-world issues, this assumption, or some-
thing like it, is certainly in place. Two inuential books, already cited above, provide
examples. In thinking about the veritistic value of science, for instance, Goldman
(1999: ch. 8) incorporates the facts that people are driven by many other desires besides
6 Perhaps identifying information about human research subjects would still need to be kept secret.
Protecting privacy may be valuable even in an ideal world, although it would surely be less of a concern
when no one ever uses personal information for malicious ends.
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an impartial interest in truth, that funding for science is limited, that journals cannot pub-
lish every paper submitted to them and that experts often give conicting testimony.
Similarly, Kitcher’s (2001) central project is to explore how science is best organized,
given the role it plays in liberal democracies, that funding for it is limited and that it is
carried out by humans who are motivated in diverse ways. All such factors have to do
with the way science has to operate in the real world, as opposed to how it might operate
in some ideal world.
The condition that we should take real-world circumstances into account when consid-
ering whether secrecy can be justied does introduce complications, for how science has to
operate in the real world is not a xed matter. The social organization of science and its
institutional contexts have changed over the years and will probably continue to do so.
This affects whether the goal of science is served by secrecy. The question then is which
of the actual circumstances we ought to keep xed in considering possible justications
of secrecy. I don’t think there is a clear-cut general answer to this question. But, surely,
at least unassailable facts about human psychology must be kept xed, as well as general
facts about the (Western) socio-political context of science, such as that it operates in lib-
eral democracies and that funding is limited and subject to public or private control.
Whether further circumstances must also be kept xed depends how plausible it is that
they can change. I will return to this point below when we discuss various motivations
for secrecy.
Someone could object that seeking to justify secrecy this way is unacceptable. Instead of
compromising on the ideal of science as an impartial and disinterested search for the truth
that has no room for secrecy, we ought to uphold that ideal by arguing for its importance
and working to remove any obstacles that stand in the way of its realization. I disagree.
Rather than arguing for an abstract ideal that disregards people’s real motivations for
doing science and the actual social organization of science, we ought to bring the ideal
down to earth and think about what it would look like when real people in our actual
world strive to attain it. I am all in favor of seeking to optimize the social organization
of science with an eye to the realization of its epistemic goal, but we should do this
while taking into account that science is a human affair, which operates in real social insti-
tutions in real societies.
5. costly evidence gathering
Let’s now investigate several prominent motivations for secrecy in science that typically
come up in conversations about the topic or are mentioned in the literature (Bok 1982;
Hull 1985; Resnik 2005).7
First, data and research materials are kept secret, or at least not shared outside a
research team, because gathering, organizing and preparing the data or materials is an
enormously time-consuming and costly process, for which the researchers want a fair
‘return on investment’ in the form of dissertations and publications. Making everything
available to the scientic community right from the start opens them to the risk of scoops.
7 In a meeting discussing practices of data sharing in the sciences organized by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences in Dec. 2011, most of the following motivations were mentioned.
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Researchers who haven’t helped to create the data set can run their own analyses and
could do so quicker than the original researchers, thus beating them to publish rst
about the ndings.
For example, in psychology and social science, longitudinal studies of people’s attitudes
towards social developments, politics, their environment, religion, wellbeing and other
issues will often take years and years of careful data gathering, coding, processing and
administering. The same goes for many research projects in other elds of science.8
Practices differ across the sciences. Sometimes, data are made publicly available or
available upon request after the initial research team has reaped the benets of temporary
exclusive access. Some journals require that data be made available upon publication, so
that they will be accessible when articles appear in print.9 In other cases, however, data are
never made publicly available at all. Sometimes publicly funded researchers choose not
make their data available – especially in areas where commercial interests loom large,
such as biomedical research or food and health research – because by doing so, they
would expose themselves to attempts by commercial rms to undermine their conclusions
by reanalyzing their data and challenging their conclusions.
This form of secrecy is often temporary. It is typically motivated by considerations of
fairness rather than epistemic considerations. This, however, doesn’t mean that there isn’t
also an epistemic justication. At rst pass, keeping data or research materials secret from
outsiders is not conducive to the goal of science. If more scientists were given access
immediately when the data become available, they could be analyzed more quickly by
more people and that would lead to (quicker) discovery of more signicant truths.
There are, however, at least two ‘real world’ factors that make this infeasible: (a)
human psychology and (b) the social organization of science, especially the emphasis
on the importance of publishing original results. I’ll argue that these two factors make
temporary secrecy about data or research materials inevitable. If scientists weren’t allowed
a period of exclusive access, they couldn’t make the required efforts to create costly and
time-consuming data sets or exclusive materials in the rst place and we would be
deprived of those truths that can be discovered by analyzing and using them.
(a) Although it is dangerous to generalize about human psychology, scientists – like
most people – care about prestige and reputation. In fact, some of them care about it a
lot, for a scientist’s reputation is perhaps the chief benet that accrues to her in the com-
munity of science. Scientic reputation is strongly determined by a scientist’s ability to dis-
cover original signicant truths and publish them rst. So if scientists did not have a
period of exclusive access to newly collected data in order to analyze and publish about
them rst, this could easily take away their motivation for collecting the data in the
rst place. Such exclusive access is exactly what temporary secrecy provides.
(b) This mechanism is reinforced by the social organization of science. Scientists’ out-
put is often evaluated by their publications and their impact, measured by the quantity
and quality of journal articles, books and their citation indices. Tenure and promotion
8 For instance, at my home institution biological psychologists investigate the genetic bases for various
physical and mental traits. They use an enormous database with information about more than
75,000 pairs of twins, which has been collected over the course of more than 25 years: the
Netherlands Twin Register, http://www.tweelingenregister.org/en.
9 This requirement, however, turns out to be frequently violated, even in journals with explicit data
sharing policies, cf. Wicherts et al. 2006; Savage and Vickers 2009.
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decisions are based on these evaluations, the success of grant applications depends on
them and scientic prizes are awarded to those who make important discoveries rst.
Although the focus on quantitative measures of scientists’ publication records is a more
recent artifact of the social organization of science, the importance of making original dis-
coveries public and establishing priority has been part of modern science since its very
inception (Merton 1973b; Hull 1985; McMullin 1985; Resnik 2005). It is a xed feature
of science in our world. Hence, a complete ban on secrecy would undermine the incentive
structure of science, because it would become much harder for scientists to reap the scien-
tic rewards of their efforts.
Given the above two xed features of real world science, keeping data or research
materials temporarily secret is epistemically justied. It is not clear that permanent secrecy
can likewise be justied. Even if a data set is continuously expanding (as with the Twin
Register), the goal of science would be better served by making the data – or at least sub-
sets of them that have already been analyzed by the core research team – more easily avail-
able to other scientists. Permanent secrecy of data and research materials, then, is not
epistemically justied.10
6. the priority rule
A second rationale also has to do with establishing priority for discoveries or inventions,
but now it concerns secrecy about conjectures, methods, or (intermediate) results. By keep-
ing these temporarily secret, scientists can buy time to develop ideas, subject them to
further scrutiny, collect additional evidence, deal with worries and objections, etc. Once
they go on to share their ndings, they will have solid support and stand up to scrutiny.
This is important, since, as I noted above, scientic recognition and rewards depend on
success in making original contributions to their eld. Keeping developing ideas secret pre-
vents competitors from hijacking them and publishing on them before they can do so
themselves.
A famous historical example is Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural
selection, which he kept secret for a long time, until a manuscript by Alfred Russell
Wallace prompted him to establish priority by publishing his own ideas rst. Another
example is the discovery of the structure of DNA molecules by James Watson and
Francis Crick. It is often speculated that Rosalind Franklin might have discovered this her-
self under slightly different circumstances, and that Watson and Crick’s success depended
crucially on their learning about elements of Franklin’s work, which she had attempted to
keep secret.
This type of secrecy is temporary; that is the very point of it. As soon as researchers feel
condent about their ideas, or fear that someone else might beat them, they will publish
their work. We can be brief about this type of secrecy, because the same reasoning applies
as in the previous section. Given human psychology and the organization of modern
science in which priority in publishing new results is a basis for scientic rewards, it fol-
lows straightforwardly that this type of temporary secrecy is epistemically justied. Even
10 This general statement needs qualication for data and research materials that are dangerous, sensitive,
or subject to privacy concerns. I will address this in section 8.
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apart from the fact that forbidding it is practically impossible, doing so would be at odds
with the central incentive scheme of (modern) science.11
7. intellectual property rights
A third rationale for secrecy stems from the process of obtaining intellectual property rights
(such as patents) on inventions.12 Since patents can only concern inventions and not discov-
eries of naturally occurring phenomena,many results of scientic research are not eligible for
patenting. But many others are. First, various areas of science are closely interwoven with
technology and research in these areas aims at technologically applicable results. This
holds for engineering disciplines, but also for biomedical research and more applied areas
of psychological and social-scientic research. Second, during recent decades the notion of
invention has been interpreted more and more broadly in patenting practice, so that nowa-
days genes are patented, aswell as various other elements of the naturalworld that are useful
for technological,medical, agricultural or other purposes (see the references in n. 12).Hence,
in many scientic elds, patenting has become common practice. Universities stimulate
scientists to apply for patents, because doing so is thought to be protable. Patents are fur-
thermore considered to be an indicator of scientic success. They strengthen a scientist’s
reputation and count in tenure and promotion decisions and grant applications.
Applying for patents leads to secrecy through the following route. To be eligible for
patenting, an invention has to qualify as novel, non-obvious and useful.13 Something
that is already part of the ‘state of the art’ is not novel and hence cannot be patented.
Once scientists have published about research that is directly relevant to an invention,
they will no longer be able to patent it, because it is then considered to be part of the
state of the art. Hence, scientists or their private sponsors who apply for patents have
to keep their ndings temporarily secret and delay publication.
Intellectual property rights in the form of patents, then, lead to temporary secrecy
about research methods and results. The question whether this is epistemically justied
amounts to the question whether a system in which academic scientists regularly attempt
to patent their results leads to more discoveries than one in which they don’t. This is a
complicated empirical question, for which it will be difcult to obtain the relevant evi-
dence. Since patenting is the norm in many areas of science, it has become impossible
to compare the situation with a control situation in which there is no extensive patenting.
What we can do, however, is investigate the default reasons given to justify the practice of
patenting in academic science in order to see whether they provide building blocks for a
possible epistemic justication.
First, the traditional justication for patenting is that it stimulates innovation.14 If
inventors weren’t given the opportunity to reap the (economic) benets of their creative
11 My argument here is qualitative, but quantitative evidence from formal models also shows that follow-
ing the priority rule in science is an efcient way of realizing the goal of science (Strevens 2003).
12 For more on the theory and practice of patenting the results of academic research, see Shulman 1999;
Sterckx 2000; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Koepsell 2009.
13 These are the US criteria. In Europe, the second and third criteria are formulated as involving a ‘gen-
uine inventive step’ and being ‘industrially applicable’ respectively.
14 See n. 12 again and also Van den Belt 2010 for a thorough historical treatment of this argument.
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work, it wouldn’t be worth their effort. Patents offer the protection needed to make this
possible by granting the patentee an exclusive right to market her invention during a xed
period of time. If this is correct and the patenting system is indeed practically necessary to
stimulate invention, this could be turned into an epistemic justication: without the possi-
bility of applying for patents, inventors would have less motivation to engage in their crea-
tive work and we would miss out on various discoveries. But why think this reasoning
applies to academic scientists? In modern universities, scientists already receive nancial
compensation for their research, primarily in the form of salaries paid by their institutions.
So there’s no obvious reason why they would need the further nancial compensation that
is made possible by obtaining patents. (And for scientists working in publicly funded insti-
tutions, it even seems inappropriate that they should use the results of their work for per-
sonal nancial gain.)
Moreover, it is often the university rather than the individual scientist who obtains the
patent. This observation is tied to a second argument, which is frequently used to justify
contemporary academic patenting practices. It is claimed that modern universities need the
income that patents generate to supplement their research budgets, because public funding
for research has been steadily declining in the US and Europe. Two points in reply. First,
we should note that, even if true, this claim is foremost an economic justication, which
can only be changed into an epistemic justication by assuming that the declining public
funding for research is one of the xed features of contemporary science. This seems
hardly plausible. Although the political climate in the US and many European countries
might make it unlikely that governments will increase their budgets for academic research
any time soon, this is clearly a political choice, and hence not a xed feature. Second, even
if we were to think of it as a xed feature, the argument has an even more debilitating pro-
blem. It is based on the false presumption that obtaining patents is indeed protable for
universities. This is simply false. Summarizing several empirical studies, Sterckx (2010:
53) summarizes the situation in no unclear terms: ‘For most universities, patenting and
licensing activities are unmistakably unprotable’ (cf. also Greenberg 2007: 51ff.).
In the absence of empirical evidence comparing academic science with and without
patenting, there remains a somewhat distant possibility that patenting is somehow condu-
cive to the goal of science after all, but, given that the two arguments above fail as epis-
temic justications, this seems unlikely. I conclude, provisionally, that there is no epistemic
justication for secrecy that is prompted by academic scientists who try to obtain patents.
8. moral and political considerations
Moral and socio-political considerations provide a fourth rationale for secrecy. In biomedi-
cal, psychological or social-scientic research it can be crucially important to protect the
privacy, health, wellbeing or other interests of human research subjects by keeping certain
sensitive information that subjects do not want to share with others secret. For that reason,
strict measures have to be taken so that data are either anonymized if they are shared, or not
shared without the subjects’ prior consent. Contemporary codes of scientic integrity
invariably contain rules about how to deal with information about human subjects.
Often, research proposals have to be reviewed by institutional review boards or ethical com-
mittees to check for conformity to these rules (Shamoo and Resnik 2009: 236ff.). Naturally,
this form of secrecy often extends over a considerable period of time or is permanent.
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Socio-political considerations about the public interest or (inter)national security can
also motivate secrecy. Military research is often kept secret in the interest of national
security (e.g. the Manhattan project). Research about dangerous viruses and chemicals
for biological or chemical warfare, as well as cryptography and computer technology pro-
vide further examples. Recently, the Dutch government attempted to prevent publication
of a scholarly paper about the potentially dangerous H5N1 avian inuenza virus in the
journal Science out of concern for public safety. Although it later reversed this decision,
the government’s actions stirred fervent debate.15 Depending on whether and how soon
potential threats to public safety or security have subsided, this type of secrecy may be
temporary or permanent.
Common to these examples is that secrecy is supposed to serve an overriding moral or
socio-political interest, which trumps the epistemic interest of openness. This doesn’t
mean, however, that such secrecy couldn’t be epistemically justied. Often, when secrecy
stands in the service of the interests of research subjects or the general public, the research
would not or could not be done if secrecy weren’t guaranteed. This is the case when
research subjects won’t provide personal information unless their privacy is guaranteed.
Assuming (a) that this is a xed feature of human psychology and (b) that this type of
research uncovers signicant truths – which seems perfectly plausible for a lot of biome-
dical, psychological and social-scientic research – there is epistemic justication for this
type of secrecy.
With military technology and dangerous chemicals or biological entities the situation is
different. First, it might be questionedwhether such research really gives us signicant truths.
Thiswill dependonwhetherand towhat extentwe think signicance is determinedby current
socio-political concerns. Assuming that it does (sometimes) uncover signicant truths, how-
ever, a second concern is that it is not obvious that research in these areas could not or would
not be done if secrecywere not guaranteed. Perhaps themilitary will not provide funding for,
say, encryption research if results are not kept condential, but it’s not implausible thatmoney
for itmight be found elsewhere.The samegoes formanyother topics that are of concern to the
public interest, (inter)national security, etc. Hence, secrecy does not seem to be inevitable to
acquire knowledge of relevant signicant truths of these kinds. But thatmeans that there is no
epistemic justication for secrecy here. To be clear, by saying so I am not denying that there
could be all-things-considered justication for it. I fully concur that moral and socio-political
reasons can sometimes trump epistemic ones.
9. commercial interests
Private interests form a fth and nal rationale for secrecy. This might take various forms,
as we saw in section 2. Industry-funded research may lead to trade secrets: information or
materials that a company keeps condential in order to have the exclusive opportunity to
make money from them. When industry funds academic science, it frequently seeks to
assert exclusive rights to claim commercially promising ndings rst. Scientists are often
required to sign non-disclosure agreements, which contain more or less restrictive con-
ditions pertaining to the sharing of data, methods, results or other elements of the
15 See http://www.sciencemag.org/site/special/h5n1.
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research. Such industry-funded research may then lead to trade secrets, patents, delayed
publication or, in some cases, attempts to suppress ndings that conict with commercial
interests. Similar arrangements are made in industry–university collaborations, when uni-
versity scientists carry out research together with scientists working in industry.
Sometimes, university scientists decide (on their own or on the instigation of their insti-
tutions) that their ndings hold commercial promise and start up their own companies
in order to market the products of their research. Often, this involves obtaining patents
for the start-up company.16
The underlying thought here is that who pays for research decides if and how its out-
comes will be shared or made public. Since companies primarily have commercial inter-
ests, they want to make sure that they can reap economic benets from projects they
sponsor and temporary or permanent secrecy is instrumental in achieving this.
This is for the most part an economic motivation, with no straightforward implications
for the epistemic justication of these kinds of secrecy. Again, however, it is possible that
the kinds of secrecy described here are inevitable for science as it has to operate in our
world. If so, there could be epistemic justication for it after all. I don’t think, however,
that this is the case. First, there is plenty of privately sponsored research that doesn’t
aim at discovering signicant truths. Commercial interests skew the research agenda
towards research that might generate lots of prot, but is uninteresting from a scientic
or public-interest perspective (Resnik 2007: 79ff.; Greenberg 2007; Musschenga et al.
2010). Even without a fully developed account of epistemic signicance, it seems obvious
that such science is not epistemically signicant. Secrecy involved in the discovery of
insignicant truths is clearly not epistemically justied, because the research itself isn’t.
Second, it will in general be instrumental to the goal of science if data, materials,
methods and results from privately funded research were to be made publicly available,
as more scientists could analyze and use them – this is the prima facie argument against
secrecy. To overturn this argument, a case has to be made that such research could not
be done without the nancial support of private sponsors. This is a tall order. It may
be very difcult, given the current socio-political climate in Western liberal democracies,
to increase public funding for science or to impose stricter regulations on interference
of private parties in academic science. Nonetheless – as I emphasized above in relation
to secrecy resulting from patenting – these are matters of political choices, albeit currently
unpopular and difcult ones. They can hardly be considered as inevitable xed features of
science. With different policy decisions, much of the research that is currently done in
close alliance with private interests could also be done with less interference from private
interests.17 I conclude that secrecy motivated by private interests is, for the most part, not
epistemically justied.18
16 Commercial interests are also the chief motivation for secrecy about what I called extrinsically episte-
mically relevant factors, such as authorship, sources of funding, etc. Since this type of secrecy borders
on deliberately misleading people and intentionally giving them incomplete information and seems in
no way necessitated by any xed features of human psychology or science, it hardly needs further argu-
ment that there is no epistemic justication for it.
17 Of course there may be exceptions. Perhaps some research projects do lead to signicant truths, but
would never be carried out unless privately sponsored. For these projects, secrecy would be epistemi-
cally justied. My point is that this will not generally be the case.
18 Again, this does not mean that there couldn’t be all-things-considered justication for such secrecy.
Perhaps economic and commercial interests sometimes trump epistemic ones.
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10. conclusion
Partly as a result of the commercialization of science, secrecy in science has increased over
recent decades. There is a strong prima facie case against secrecy in science, both from the
normative ideal of science as a disinterested, collective and open truth-seeking endeavor
and from consequentialist considerations about what is most conducive to the goal of dis-
covering signicant truths. I have argued that, nonetheless, some forms of secrecy in
science are epistemically justied. In particular, temporary secrecy that is necessary to
let scientists reap the epistemic benets of costly research efforts and to establish priority
are conducive to the goal of discovering signicant truths. Secrecy required to protect the
privacy or other interests of human research subjects is also epistemically justied. Secrecy
motivated by public interests, such as safety or health, is not epistemically justied,
although it may nonetheless be all-things-considered justied, since the relevant moral
and political concerns plausibly trump purely epistemic ones. Secrecy arising from private
interests or from the attempt to obtain intellectual property rights, however, generally
lacks epistemic justication.
Reecting on these ndings, we see that epistemically justied forms of secrecy have in
common that they are motivated by more or less universal moral concerns, such as fair-
ness or the protection of privacy. Epistemically unjustied secrecy, however, arises from
special – in the present social context of science, often commercial – interests. This
holds an important lesson for societies that want to value science for its epistemic
worth, rather than its potential economic role. Those societies should attempt to put pol-
icies in place that prevent special interests from intermingling with (academic) science as
much as they can, since this intermingling leads to epistemically undesirable effects.
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